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Abstract 
This study evaluates the effectiveness of microfinance policy in Nigeria from 2010 to 2017. The Study used AMJU 
Microfinance Bank as its sample and the objectives of the study are to examine appropriate client targeting 
mechanisms that enhance good microfinance practice aimed at poverty reduction and how client impact evaluation 
improves operational efficiency and effectiveness. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique of micro 
econometric framework was used to establish the counterfactual for participants. The fundamental evaluation 
problem of selection bias was treated in the study and primary data obtained through interviews  were analysed. 
The findings show that microfinance client exist rate was on the increase for established clients being significant; 
and client loan size dissatisfaction for older clients was on the rise and customers that have benefited from micro-
credits were better-off than non-beneficiaries. The study concludes that Microfinance is effective in poverty 
reduction and recommends amongst others that the delivery methodology should be tailored after their operational 
strategy and target clients; and also, appropriate feedback mechanism be built into their product and services 
delivery to encourage impact evaluation of participants’ responses, thereby, providing relevant inputs for the 
formulation of effective National Microfinance Policy in Nigeria.  
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1.0 Introduction  
1.1 Background to the Study  
There has been a growing interest towards recognizing the need to extend financial services freedom to the poor 
to enable them pursue legitimate economic diversification geared towards survival as well as improving their 
economic goals. Several schemes were advanced by government to provide the much needed financial succor to 
this target group, but were characterized by problems such as shallow rooted policy, poor implementation, high 
default rates, interest rate barriers, corruption and bias allocation (Johnson & Royaly, 1997; and Morduch, 1999).  
The attention paid to this subsector by funding institutions and donor agencies as well as research work by 
various scholars are yet to yield the expected result on the economy as Nigeria is still ranked among the nations 
with high poverty index. This study is aimed at investigating the effectiveness of the National Microfinance Policy 
adopted by the Nigeria government and assessing the extent to which the policy has positively affected poverty 
level in the country. Unlike the past microfinance impact studies on Nigeria (Anyanwu, 2004; Udy, 1993) that 
focused on service availability and poverty reduction depth, this study used econometric analysis in assessing the 
effectiveness of Microfinance policies on Nigeria economy using AMJU UNIQUE (MFB) LTD as sample study.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study  
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of microfinance policy in Nigeria, studying one 
of the vibrant performing microfinance institution, AMJU Unique (MFB) Ltd.  
The specific objectives are to: 
(i) To determine the appropriate client targeting to promote good microfinance practice;  
(ii) To ascertain whether impact evaluation of microfinance services helps in improving operational 
efficiency of microfinance institutions.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses of the Study  
For the purpose of this study the following hypotheses were tested.  
Ho1: Client targeting strategy cannot promote good microfinance practice in Nigeria.  
Ho2: Impact evaluation is not an effective tool for formulation and implementation of national  microfinance 
policy.  
 
2.0 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE  
2.1 Conceptual Issues  
Microfinance is a programme that extends small loans (credit) to the poor for self-employment projects that have 
the capacity to generate income, allowing for sustain ace of the entire family (micro-credit Summit, 1997). 
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However, micro-credit is a subset of microfinance. Microfinance is the extension of long term financial services 
to willing low income bracket in the society.  
Microfinance offer financial services in the forms of credits micro-insurance, savings, money transfer, micro 
portfolio advice and other social services that can enhance the welfare of the poor and its family. It’s services can 
target the rural, semi-rural and/or urban poor to enable income generation and improve standard of living 
(Townsend and Kaboski, 2005). It is a system of decentralized credit delivery marked by the substitution of 
individual banking by social intermediation, whose financial intermediaries are people’s organizations (Nair, 
2001). 
Microfinance is seen to be characterized by doorstep service delivery. Transaction in small amounts, collateral 
substitution and focus on poor especially women (Karlan & Goldbery, 2006) top reduce poverty and improve self-
worth. This is not a one-off or charity lending and not targeted at the upper class of the society.  
 
2.2 Microfinance Subsector and Financial Development  
Cameron et al (1967) opined that despite the direction of the relationship (growth-inducing or growth-induce), 
imperati9ve is the quality and efficiency of the services offered by the sector, which include: providing incentives 
to investors, at low cost 10 encourage huge investments, channeling small funds from savings to encourage 
entrepreneurial drive, promoting technological progress as it enhances access to banking and creating possibilities 
for a more efficient allocation of the often unproductive stock of initial wealth in the early stages of 
industrialization. The need to attain higher levels of growth through financial development which can reduce 
poverty was supported (Beck et al, 2004). Hence, a sound financial environment predicate a link between financial 
development and poverty reduction.  
Pertinent upon the financial sector development, strategies should include bringing on board the informal 
sector, a vehicle for uplifting the poor. The informal sector predates the formal sector, hence Johnson (2005) opines 
the financial sector is intrinsically dualistic. As observed by Wai (1992), there is need by researchers to investigate 
the informal financial arrangements. Aryeetey and Udy (1997) affirm that the informal financial arrangements are 
those parts of the overall financial system that fall outside the regulated sector. To this, the arrival of the informal 
sector is a reprisal to financial repression and regulation (Fry, 1995; Patrick, 1996). Though, inestimable the size 
of the informal sector, available statistics reveal they form the bulk of the credit needs of the poor (Aryeetey, 1995 
and Nissanke, 1991). Thus, the contributions of the informal sector to financial development and poverty reduction 
cannot be ignored. A major component of the informal sector is the microfinance industry (MFI) that has been 
evolving over time.  
The achievement of the Millennium Development Goal (MOG) is the demarginalization of microfinance 
programmes (Barr, 2004). To achieve these goals various nations designed approaches and implementation of the 
economic development programmes. These approaches includes the development of the financial sector involving 
several return programmes with their attendant implications for poverty reduction through financial markets 
deepening and institutional capacity building.  
 
2.3 Microfinance Policy Development Strategies  
Development via the modernization model, especially the direct-credit programmes were frustrated by weak 
institutions, flourishing corruption, bureaucratic restricts, bloated overhead, transaction costs, poor client targeting 
and limited products (Morduch, 1999; Adams et al, 1984). Loans were viewed as grants and the institutional 
framework was viewed with suspicion resulting in loans default. Sometimes halving the entire capital (Hulme and 
Mosely, 1996 and George, 1990).  
The 1970s experienced a new approach to development effort in which there was a mindset viewing economic 
growth as the main development goal that takes into cognizance, poverty reduction and rural development. 
Subsequently, in the 1980s, heralded the structural adjustment programme (SAP) in developing economies, 
coupled with the debt stocks and the acceptance of neo-liberalism by the advanced economies, made way for free 
market reforms in government intervention in many sectors (Osthoff, 2005; Okojie et al, 2000; Iyoha, 1998; 
Obadan, 1997; Aryeetey, 1995 and Oyejide, 1993). Thus the government subsidized credit schemes were absorbed 
by this new development paradigm through the emergence of a more market-based approach. Consequently, the 
emergence of microfinance however, unusual financial practice, provided financial window to low income 
brackets. Succinctly put, the failure of past development strategies provoked the emergence and rapid expansion 
of microfinance (Osthoff, 2005; Moutgomery & Weiss, 2005; Kabeer, 2005; Barr, 2004; Otero, 1999 and Morduch, 
1999).  
 
2.4 Poverty Alleviation Programme    
Two ways by which the provision of financial services in general and microfinance in particular can have impact 
on poverty was included in the 2010/2011 world development report, known as the income-generating effect which 
enhances the poor economies through investment in assets that are affordable. This helps to upgrade the family 
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from stable below poverty line to stable above poverty line (Osthoff, 2005) and the vulnerability effect in which 
families are able to reduce the effects of income fluctuations thereby enhancing consumption smoothening and 
other coping strategies.  
The participation dimension of poverty comprises many forms of deprivation such as humiliation and 
isolation, powerlessness and social inferiority (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). In this dimension of poverty, 
microfinance takes a broader perspective of poverty reduction to include non-material possessions. A major is the 
extent of empowerment of women. Empowerment strategy breaks the vicious circle of poverty.  
 
2.5 Microfinance Service Provision  
Microfinance institutions are expected to take into account varying needs of the poor in the design of their products. 
That is, designing and implementing microfinance services, there is need to consider that credit has varying 
implications for different segment of the poor and as such could create additional risk for them if not properly 
directed (Hulme & Mosely, 1996). Microfinance encompasses both financial and social intermediation including 
group formation, and training in financial literacy and management practices (Kalpana, 2004). Expedient upon 
microfinance institutions to diversify their hitherto relatively homogenous products and services to include 
environmental considerations.  
 
2.6 Prospective Clients  
The issue of who should constitute a majority of microfinance clients, men or women have been a friction. Some 
literature have opined female dominated clientele, but recent studies have proven otherwise (Brau & Woller, 2004; 
Amm et al, 2003). The argument in favour of women as clients is the assumption of better usage of credits and 
focus on family. A view of the sustainable Development Goal (SDG) is that women are critical to achieving these 
goals, hence the motivation to target them. The access to financial services empower women both financially and 
socially, hence their large number as clients to microfinance (Tassel, 2004) and World Bank (2007) confirm that 
most microfinance programmes are targeted towards. Women a contrary view was expressed by (Murduch, 1996) 
suggesting microfinance did not perform better with women as target. However, gender is not a determinant of 
poverty or poverty being gender sensitive.  
 
2.7 The Business of Microfinance Banking in Nigeria  
Nigeria is endowed with a huge population of abo9ut 200 million people as at 2018, of which 60% is predominantly 
rural (NBC, 2016) with a physical spread of 923,768km2. A West African country and strong player in regional 
economics and politics, bounded in the North by the Nigeria Republic, west by Benin Republic, east by the Chad 
and Cameroun and Gulf of Guinea in the South. It comprises of 36 Administrative states and a federal capital 
reserve, Abuja. These broken down into 774 local government areas (LGAs). She got her political independence 
in October of 1960, an hitherto colony of Britain. For over two decades, it was administered by the military. In 
May of 1999 a new democratic setting emerged and still running till date. Despite its seemly progress, it still parade 
indices of poverty characterized by unchecked population growth, slow development, unstable macroeconomic 
environment buffeted by internal and external crisis and a micro economy, heavily reliant on crude petroleum. The 
discovery, which have relegated other sectors. The cry for economic diversification had been on, but only serious 
when oil and gas price shocks are experienced and relapses as soon as the price is stable. The current dispensation 
is giving an unserious try to this effort but laden with huge debt. As at the time of this study, it owed $6.7 trillion 
external debt and N22.4 trillion internal debt with 15% attracted bytes 36 states of the country.  
Specifically, in terms of macroeconomic indicators, Nigeria witnessed a consistent decline in growth rate, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and rising inflation consecutively between 2014-2017, thereby eroding the saving 
capability of most households. Nigeria economy is also experiencing an increase in debt to GDP ratio resulting in 
low foreign investment and inability of the government to meet developmental programmes in the areas of poverty 
alleviation, infrastructural development and jobs creation. Also, credit extension to the private sector is low, 
limiting their capabilities of investment activities vis-à-vis poverty reduction.  
 
2.8 Theoretical Issues in Microfinance  
There is increasing need among development agencies, donors, government and private concerns to undertake a 
robust evaluation of any intervention programme. The fundamental question to address about a programme is if 
objectives have been met within cost. In other words, impact evaluation can provide information on whether a 
programme measurably benefits participants in comparison with those who did not participate. Although, many 
stakeholders are eager to undertake formal evaluation of their programmes due to cost implications and the 
limitation of the outcomes of evaluation (Ogiogio, 2006). A main constraint encountered in most evaluation 
programmes is getting key players to agree to conducting the evaluation as fear of vested interest may be hindered 
or due to other ethical objectives. Again, many organisation regard negative findings as hindrance to foster their 
agenda (Ravillion, 2005; Hulme, 2000 and 1997; and Baker, 1999). Despite these apprehension, the benefits of 
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conducting impact evaluation are huge (Karlan & Goldberg, 2006).  
To have a proper understand of the right methodology to employ in an impact evaluation, there is the need to 
have a grasp of the basic concept of impact evaluation. The World Bank (2002) defined impact evaluation on a 
“systematic identification of the effects on individuals, households, institutions and the environment caused by a 
given development activity such as a programme or project”. Evaluation can be analytical assessment of a 
programme (OECD, 1999). Thus, an evaluation can take the form of beneficiary assessment, indicator monitoring, 
public expenditure tracking survey, rapid appraisals, concurrent assessment policy-level assessment and tracer 
studies (Bloomquist, 2003). It is aimed at assessing programmes performance against explicit counterfactual, such 
as the situation in the absence of the programme (Ravallion, 2005). Impact evaluation therefore, can be both ex-
ante and ex-post.  
 
2.9 Empirical Literature on Microfinance  
Pitt et al (2003) also evaluated the Bangladesh (BRAC, BRDB, Grameen  bank) using the maximum likelihood 
estimation controlling for endogeity of individual participation and of placement of microfinance programmes. 
Impact variables being health of men and women (arm measure, body mass under (BMI) and height-for-age). 
Result shows significantly positive effects of female credit on height-for-age and arm circumference of both men 
and women. Borrowing by men has either negative or non-significant impact on health of children.  
Amin et al (2003) examined Bangladesh (ASD, Grameen Bank, BRAC) using non parametric test of 
stochastic dominance of average monthly consumption or members and nonmembers and maximum likelihood 
test of micro credit membership on vulnerability, consumption and household characteristics. Findings indicate 
members are poorer than non-members. Programmes are more successful at reaching the vulnerable.  
Kaboski and Townsend (2002) tested Thailand (production credit groups, rice banks, women groups, buffalo 
banks) using two stage LS and MLE test of microfinance impact on asset growth, probability of reduction in 
consumption in bad years, probability of becoming money lender, probability of starting business and probability 
of changing job. Separate estimation according to types of MFI. Result were that production credit groups and 
women groups combined with training and savings have positive impact on asset growth, although rice banks and 
buffalo banks have negative impacts. Emergency services training and savings help to smooth responses to income 
shock. Women groups help to reduce reliance on money lenders.  
 
3.0 Data and Methodology  
3.1 Sources of Data and Description  
This study makes use of cross-section data of primary nature. A sample of six hundred and forty (640) clients of 
AMJU (MFB) Ltd, an MFI licensed by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under Banks and other financial 
Institution (BOFIA)I Act No.25 of 1999. It started operation in May, 2000.  
This study utilized cross-section data. A sample of six hundred and forty (640) clients of AMJU, an MFI in Nigeria 
was used.  
The poverty scores were calibrated as: Least poor = 0-27 code (12), Less poor = (28-45) code (2), average 
poor = (46-63), code (3), poor = (64-82) code (4) and poorest = (84-100) code (5). High scores are assigned to low 
level of the poverty indicators. A client is registered as a member to participate in AMJU programmes if his/her 
poverty score is at least 46 (i.e. average poor to poorest). Thus, programme placement is determined by a “proxy-
means test” (assignment of a score to all potential participants as a function of observable characteristics) as often 
used for targeting anti-poverty programmes in developing countries (Ravallion, 2005).  
 
3.2 Sample Selection  
The sample was drawn from twenty (20) unions spread across ten (10) branches in five locations. The observable 
characteristics of interest include: age, sex, previous business experience (in years), loan stage, loan type and 
location. Data were also collected on marital status, education level, primary business and poverty scores at 
registration for membership and on completion of loan cycle. In line with Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), 
these variables are those that influence simultaneously the participation decision as well as the outcome variable. 
Furthermore, the variables are either fixed over time or are measured before participation. Also as noted by 
Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999), the data for both the treatment and non-treatment groups are from the same 
population, a basic requirement for matching. All variables were categorical data, hence reflecting only the 
direction of change and not the exact magnitude.  
In addition to the pipeline comparator, this study also employed propensity score matching to correct for 
selection bias. Analysis of the characteristics of all clients was used to create the control group. To validate these 
observables, we carried out a qualitative fieldwork of a sample of clients of AMJU. A propensity function was 
generated linking client characteristics to the likelihood that a client will access loan from the programme on 
members. The results of a recent study by Frȍlich (2006) on Gender Wage Gap of College Graduates in the UK 
showed that the propensity score matching is justified under the same assumption than matching on covariates and 
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that choice-based sampling can be ignored. In other words, PSM can be applied without conditional independence 
assumption and on non-independently and identically distributed (iid) data. Hence, PSM allows estimation of mean 
impacts without arbitrary assumptions about functional forms and error distributions. This facilitates testing for 
the presence of potentially complex interaction effects.  
 
3.3 Model Specification   
For an anti-poverty programme, the objective is usually defined in terms of household income or expenditure (on 
consumption) normalized by a household specific poverty score.  
Given that the impact on poverty is known, then set Y = 1 as the outcome with treatment and Y = 0 as the 
outcome without treatment. Since an individual cannot be in both states, then it is not possible to observe Y = 0 
and Y = 1 for the same individual thereby leading to the problem of missing data (Essama-Nssah, 2006; Ravallion, 
2005 and Wooldridge, 2002). To guard against the possibility of the case where the treatment of one unit affects 
another’s outcome as may be in general equilibrium effect (Heckman et al., 1998), the sample from the population 
is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid). In many cases the outcomes Y = 0 and Y = 1 are 
binary.  
Let the variable T be a binary treatment indicator, such that T = 1 implies treatment and T = 0 denotes without 
treatment. Presuming that the data include an observation Y1 for each unit I in a sample of size n. The value Yi 
under treatment is YiT and YiC under the counterfactual of not receiving treatment. The benefit (gain) to unit i who 
received treatment is given as:  
Gi = YiT – YiC|T = 1 …………………………………………………………………………. 3.17 
As noted above, due to the problem of missing data, we assume that we can only observe Ti, YiT for Ti = 1;YiC = 
0 and thus, the fundamental problem of evaluating this individual treatment effect arises because the observed 
outcome for each individual is given by:  
Yi = TiYiT + (1 – Ti)YiC …………………………………………………………………….. 3.18 
The average gain, which is the mean of all the Gs gives the sample mean gain for all the treated. This is called the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) given by:  
ATET = E(G|T = 1) = E(YT|T = 1) – E(YC|T = 1) …………………………………………. 3.19 
Equation (3.19) is the mean impact on poverty among those who actually received the programmes. In other words, 
ATET is the difference between expected outcome values with and without treatment for those who actually 
participated in treatment. Similarly, the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATEUT) is given as: 
ATEUT = E(G|T = 0) = E(YT|T = 0) – E(YC|T=0)…………………………………………. 3.20 
The overall mean impact of the programme is the sum of equations (3.19) and (3.20) called the average treatment 
effect given by:  
Ate = E(G) = ATET + ATEUT …………………………………………………………….. 3.21 
Consider X as a vector of covariates (observable characteristics), then interest may be on the following conditional 
mean impacts.  
ATET (X) = E(G|X, T = 1) 
ATEUT(X) = E(G|X, T = 0) 
ATE (X) = E(G|X) 
Frolic (2006), Ravallion (2005) and Wooldridge (2002) agree that the most common method of 
introducing X assumes that the Y’s are linear in the their parameters and the error terms (T and C). hence we 
have regression equations given as:  
YiT = XiβT + iT (i = 1, …, n) ……………………………………………………………….3.23 
YiC = XiβC + iC (i = 1, …, n) ……………………………………………………………… 3.24 
Basically in equations (3.23) and (3.24), X is assumed to be exogenous, hence,  
E(T|X) = E(C|X) = 0  
The mean impacts are derived as:  
ATE(X) = X(βT - βC) …………………………………………………………………………3.25 
ATET(X) = ATE(X) + E(T - C|X,T = 1) ……………………………………………………3.26 
ATEUT(X) = ATE(X) + E(T - C|X,T = 0) ………………………………………………….3.27 
It should be noted that Gi cannot be observed directly for any i since data on YiT for Ti = 0 and YiC for Ti = 1 are 
missing. Again, without further assumption, it may not be possible to identify the impacts since e(YC|T = 1)j and 
E(YT = 0) are not directly estimable from the data. However, we can form a control group or develop an 
econometric modeling strategy that provides a consistent estimate. Also, equations (3.23) and (3.24) no longer 
constitute estimable models in view of the problem of missing data. To obtain a point estimate on mean impact, 
the starting point is to adopt the approach of the simple-difference (D) in the conditional mean outcome between 
the treated and the non-treated. This is based on the assumption of ignorability of treatment introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) stated as follows: 
Assumption 2.1: Conditional on X, then T and (YT, YC) are independent.  
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Hence, the single – difference is given as:  
D(X) = E(YiT|Xi,Ti = 1) –E(YiC|Xi,Ti = 0) …………………………………………………… 3.28 
Equation (3.28) can be estimated by the difference in the corresponding sample means or equivalently by the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression coefficient of Y on T.  
For the parametric model with controls, equation (3.23) can be estimated on the sample of treated while equation 
(3.24) on the rest of the sample, therefore resulting in the following estimable model.  
YiT = XiβT + TifTi = 1 …………………………………………………………………….. 3.29 
YiC = XiβC + iCifTi = 0 ……………………………………………………………………..3.30 
Ravallion (2005) explains that the common practice is to estimate a simple (“switching”) regression for the 
observed outcome measure on the pooled sample, leading to a “random coefficient” specification. Substituting 
equations (3.29) and (3.30) into the identity Yi = TiYiT + (1 – Ti)YiC at equation (3.18), then we have:  
Yi = XiβC + Xi(βT - βC)Ti + εi; (i = 1, …, n) …………………………………………………. 3.31 
Where εi = Ti(iT - iC) + iC 
Adopting the common-impact-model for which Gi = G, then equation (3.31) becomes a regression of Y on T and 
X given by: 
Yi = (βoT – βoC)Ti + XiβC + εi …………………………………………………………………..3.32 
Where βoT and βoC are the intercepts in equations (3.29) and (3.30) and εi = iC.  
To obtain unbiased impact estimates, we first consider the difference in mean outcome between the treated and 
non-treated at equation (3.28). This can be re-written as:  
D(X) = ATE(X) + BLASATET(X) ………………………………………………………………3.33 
Hence, the bias is:  
BLASATET(X) = E(YC|X, T = 1) – E(YC|X, T = 0)……………………………………………. 3.34 
Also, for the un-treated, the bias is obtained as:   
BIASATEUT (X) = E(YT|X, T = 1) – E(YT|X, T = 0) ………………………………………….3.35 
Then the bias for the average treatment effect is:  
BIASATE(X) = BIASATET(X), Pr(T = 1) – BIASATEUT(X).Pr(T = 0) ………………………….3.36 
If we assume that BIASATET = 0, then OLS applied to equation (3.32) will produce consistent estimation.  
3.3.1 Assessing the Matching Quality  
To ensure that the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control 
and treatment group, the quality of matching can be assessed using the Heckman-Hotz (1989) indirect test, 
standardized Bias, t-test, Joint significance and Pseudo-R2 and Stratification test. 
The Standardized Bias is used the distance in marginal distribution of the X-variables. For each covariate X, 
this is defined as the difference of sample means in the treated and matched control sub-samples as a percentage 
of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups. The standardized bias for before and after 
matching are given as follows:  
 = 100.  −  0.5[ +  ] … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . 3.45 
And  
 = 100.  −  0.5[ + ] … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . 3.46 
Where   is the mean (variance) in the treatment group before matching and  the analogue for the 
control group.  and  are the corresponding values for the matched samples.  
The t-test uses a two-sample t-test to check if there are significant differences in covariate mean for the two groups 
(Rosebaum & Rubin, 1985). The Pseudo-R2 shows the extent the regressors X explain the probability of 
participation. The stratification test is used to t4est after dividing the observations into strata, if within each stratum 
the distribution of X-variables is the same for both groups.  
3.3.2 Estimating the Variance of Treatment Effects  
The variances of the treatment effects (ATE and ATET) are not usually easy to compute because of the inclusion 
of the variance due to estimation of the propensity score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005). However, under 
unconfoundedness assumption, Haln (1998) estimated the asymptotic variances of ATT and ATET as follows:  
!"#$% = & '(
)
* + 
()1 − * + &+$| − &+-| − ./&)0 … … … … … … … … … … 3.47 
And  
!"#$%$23456575 = & '*(
)
* +  
*()&[*])1 − * +
&+$| − &-| − ./&)*
&[*]) 0 … … … … 3.48 
Where ($) are the conditional outcome variance for the treated (T = 1) and untreated (T = 0) observations.  
The estimation of the above variances can be carried out by variance approximation by Lechner (2001) through 
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nearest-neighbour (NN) matching as follows  
!"./&/ =  9:  ;.< +$|/ = 1 +  
=∑ ?∈{BCD E?FG
9:G  . !" +-|/ = 0 … … … … … … … … 3.49   
Where N1 is the number of matched treated individuals and IJ is the number of timers individual j from 
control group has been used taking into account matching with replacement. The approach assumes 
homescedasticity of the variances of the outcome variables within treatment and control groups.  
To distinguish between population and variances, Abadie and Imbens (2006) estimated the sample-average 
treatment effect on the treated (SATET) as:  
./&/           =  1K  L [+$ − +-] … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . 3.50M∈{$N}
 
Depriving a matching variance estimator that does not require additional non-parametric estimation, the 
variance or SATET is given by:  
!" ./&/ =  1 K  L[/ − 1 − /.  
PQR ]). (S$) … … … … … … … … … … … … . 3.51 
Where M is the number of matches and KM(i) is the number of times unit i is used as a match.  
 
3.4 Counterfactual Construction  
This study adopted the application of quasi-experimental design because of its ability to resolve problems of 
endogeneity associated with non-random programme placement and self-selection of members of the treatment 
group. The matching method using pipeline comparison group was adopted where the control group consisted of 
those clients who were assessed as poor, registered as members of the microfinance programme but were yet to 
access loans or had accessed loan the first time but were yet to complete their first loan cycle. In this study, the 
treatment and control group, have similar observable characteristics as portrayed by the poverty score at point of 
registration in addition to the demographic characteristics, thus, the issue of selection bias has been reduced. This 
matching ability of the control group was established using equations (3.37) to 3.44).  
Galasso and Ravallion (2004) and Chase (2002) affirm that the use of pipeline comparison helps to address 
the problem of latent heterogeneity. Testing for observable differences between the treatment and non-treatment, 
Galasso and Ravallion (2004) in their study of Social Protection Programme in Argentina in which the pipeline 
comparison was adopted, found that the observables including idiosyncratic shocks were well balanced between 
the two groups. Thus, for this study, the pipeline comparator was employed because there has not been any material 
change in the criteria for registration as a member of AMJU programmes.  
 
4.0 Presentation and Analysis of Empirical Results  
4.1 Characteristics of AMJU Clients 
In terms of gender targeting, about 82.8% of the union members of AMJU programmes are female members (Table 
4.1). This is consistent with AMJU’s mission of empowering poor clients who are locked out of institutional credit 
due to lack of command over land, stocks and other forms of acceptable collaterals.  
Table 4.1: Gender Distribution of Sampled Clients at Registration  
 
Sex 
Treatment group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
Male  90 17.2 12 10.3 102 17.2 
Female 433 82.8 105 89.7 538 82.8 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
 
Table 4.2: Age Distribution of Sampled Clients at Registration  
 
Age (years) 
Treatment group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
18-25 18 3.4 6 5.1 24 3.8 
26-35 174 33.3 48 41.0 222 34.7 
36-45 198 37.9 43 36.8 241 37.7 
46-55 103 19.7 12 10.3 115 18.0 
56-65 23 4.4 7 6.0 30 4.7 
66 and above 7 1.3 1 0.9 8 1.3 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
About 94.3% of the sampled clients are between 26 and 55 years of age. This age bracket is the bedrock of 
the economically active population. It reflects good targeting for a microfinance institution whose mission is to 
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assist the active poor to build viable and sustainable micro-enterprises. 
Table 4.3: Level of Education of Sampled Clients at Registration  
 
Education  
Treatment group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
No Education 20 3.8 5 4.3 25 3.9 
Half Primary 38 7.3 4 3.4 42 6.6 
Full Primary 165 31.5 29 24.8 194 30.3 
Half Secondary 90 17.2 24 20.5 114 17.8 
Full Secondary  196 37.5 51 43.6 247 38.6 
Tertiary 14 2.7 4 3.4 18 2.8 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
Most AMJU clients (about 89%) have a minimum of full primary education. This facilitates better 
communication between AMJU staff and the clients. Also, it helps clients to quickly understand AMJU’s 
philosophy and enhancing their skills in new business development.  
Table 4.4: Marital Status of Sampled Clients at Registration  
 
Marital Status  
Treatment Group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
Married 417 79.7 91 77.8 508 79.4 
Living with a companion  30 5.7 11 9.4 41 6.4 
Single/never married 26 5.0 6 5.1 32 5.0 
Single/Divorced  16 3.1 5 4.3 21 3.3 
Single/Widowed 34 6.5 4 4.3 21 3.3 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
The majority, about 90.0% of the clients sampled have lived with a partner or have been married. This is a 
good parameter in group formation as only 5.0% of the clients had not been involved in marital affairs. There is 
implied sense of responsibilities among clients as the microfinance services are expected to be directed towards 
the well-being of the families of clients.  
Table 4.5: Location of Sampled Clients at Registration  
 
Location  
Treatment group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
Urban/Semi-Urban 312 59.7 70 59.8 382 59.7 
Rural 211 40.3 47 40.2 258 40.3 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
About sixty percent (60%) of AMJU clients are in the urban/semi-urban areas because of high population 
density. This facilitates group formation at low cost. However, most rural poor are excluded from benefiting from 
such services because of risk-return considerations. As noted by ADB (2000), most private MFIs are reluctant to 
invest in financial technology and innovative programmes oriented to the rural poor because the belief is that the 
market among the poor is limited and externalities will not allow the MFIs to profit from their investments.  
Table 4.6: Previous Business Experience of Sampled Clients at Registration  
 
Years of Previous Business 
Experience  
Treatment group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
Less than one 1 year 7 1.3 4 3.4 11 1.7 
1-3 years  121 23.1 30 25.6 151 23.6 
4-6 years  130 24.9 49 41.9 179 28.0 
7-9 years  151 28.9 22 18.8 173 27.0 
10 years and above  114 21.8 12 10.3 126 19.7 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
It appears that prior knowledge of a business is a requirement for eligibility to participate in AMJU 
programmes. This is probably to guard against fungibility of money and thus ensure that clients use the micro 
loans for intended purpose (improving their businesses) and thus translate to improvement in the general well-
being of clients. 
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Table 4.7: Loan Stage of Sampled Clients at Registration  
 
Loan Stage  
Treatment group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
0 0 0.0 117 100.0 117 18.3 
1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
2 238 45.5 0 0.0 238 37.2 
3 37 7.1 0 0.0 37 5.8 
4 77 14.7 0 0.0 77 12.0 
5 51 9.8 0 0.0 51 8.0 
6 28 5.4 0 0.0 28 4.4 
7 40 7.6 0 0.0 40 36.3 
8 33 6.3 0 0.0 33 5.2 
9 and above 19 3.6 0 0.0 19 3.0 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
From table 4.7, it is evident that members of the treatment group are clients in their second loan stage or more 
while the control group consists of clients yet to receive any loan. This enhances the construction of appropriate 
counterfactual.  
Table 4.8: Poverty Targeting of Clients at Registration  
 
Poverty Score  
Treatment group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
Least Poor (0-27) 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Less Poor (28-45) 10 1.9 2 1.7 12 1.9 
Average Poor (46-63) 311 59.5 62 53.0 373 58.3 
Poor (64-81) 190 36.3 50 42.7 240 37.5 
Poorest (84-100) 12 2.3 3 2.6 15 2.3 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
In consonance with AMJU’s mission, the targeting tool employed enhanced the recruitment of the poor into 
its programmes. From the sampled clients (table 4.8), about 98% of AMJU clients are considered at least to be 
average poor. This recruitment criterion is a major variable in using the propensity score matching methods to 
establish the adequacy of the non-treatment group.  
Table 4.9: Primary Business of Clients at Registration  
 
Primary Business  
Treatment Group Non-Treatment Group All Clients 
No. 
523 
 
% 
No. 
117 
 
% 
No. 
640 
 
% 
Crop production  61 11.7 4 3.4 65 10.2 
Animal Production 8 1.5 1 0.9 9 1.4 
Soap Production 8 1.5 2 1.7 10 1.6 
Catering Services 7 1.3 6 5.1 13 2.0 
Restaurant Services  19 3.6 8 6.8 27 4.2 
Tailoring 24 4.6 3 2.6 27 4.2 
Hair Dressing  18 3.4 8 6.8 26 4.1 
Selling “Okika” Cloths 28 5.4 3 2.6 31 4.8 
Selling New Cloths 14 2.7 14 12.0 28 4.4 
Selling Agro Crops 16 3.1 5 4.3 21 3.3 
Shop for Foodstuff  53 10.1 21 17.9 74 11.6 
Provision/Cosmetic Shop 68 13.0 14 12.0 82 12.8 
Selling Livestock 10 1.9 2 1.7 12 1.9 
Kiosk for Foodstuff 23 4.4 7 6.0 30 4.7 
Kiosk for Provision/Cosmetic  16 3.1 5 4.3 21 3.3 
Employed worker  3 0.6 1 0.9 4 0.6 
Labourer 2 0.4 1 0.9 3 0.5 
Farming  144 27.5 12 10.3 156 24.4 
Others  1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.2 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
About sixty percent (60%) of the sampled clients are high turnover businesses of petty trading (e.g. 
restaurant/catering services, hair dressing, selling of second-hand and new clothes, shop for foodstuff, 
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provision/cosmetic shops/kiosk) which is usually a pre-condition for regular repayment programmes of 
microfinance. These types of small enterprises are usually supported through micro-loans. Also, the homogeneity 
in the type of businesses facilitates the group lending methodology. This may appear to present a threat to the 
livelihood of the group due to correlated business risks. However, there is an inherent opportunity as it helps to 
lower monitoring costs of group members because of their technical familiarity with other members’ business 
activities (Pagura, 2003).  
Table 4.10: Level of Poverty Reduction Among Treatment Group  
 
Poverty Score  
Treatment group 
No. 
523 
 
% 
Reduced by 56 points and above  4 0.8 
Reduced by 46-55 points 2 0.4 
Reduced by 36-45 points  13 2.5 
Reduced by 26-35 points  26 5.0 
Reduced by 16-25 points  113 21.6 
Reduced by 1-15 points  276 52.8 
No change (zero points) 64 12.2 
Increased by 1-15 points  24 4.6 
Increased by 16-25 points  1 0.2 
Source(s): Author’s Computation. 
The level of poverty reduction (table 4.10) among the treatment group shows that 82.0% of the clients noticed 
a reduction in their poverty score as a result of accessing loans from the AMJU programmes. The reduction in 
poverty level cuts across the eligibility criteria (irregular household income, poor nutritional status, unhealthy 
condition of dwelling place; etc) for recruitment of clients into AMJU programmes. The revelation enhances the 
attainment of AMJU’s mission of targeting the poor. Nonetheless, 4.8% claimed that their level of poverty has 
worsened while about 12.2% did not notice any change in their poverty status after accessing loan from the 
programme. A major reasons is that the loan amount is too small to meet their business expansion requirements. 
It is therefore imperative that producer design should take into consideration the peculiar needs of certain clients 
instead of providing one-size fit-all products to all clients.  
 
4.2 Policy Implications of Findings  
The empirical findings of this study have the following policy implications that will help in the implementation of 
the national microfinance development strategy.  
(i) A one-size-fits-all model microfinance delivery mechanism is counter-productive. Instead, MFIs 
should conduct their operations using a combination of delivery methodology (group or individual) 
that differentiates among the macroeconomic environment including spatial dispersion of population 
and other microfinance – driven characteristics (e.g. nature of clients’ business and gender 
concentration).  
(ii) Policy makers should encourage the conduct of impact evaluation particularly on certain intermediate 
indicators. Inter-temporal behavioural responses of participants in a programme are relevant to 
understanding their impacts (see Ravallion & Chen, 2005). 
(iii) A major challenge for policy makers is to design policies that promote microfinance practice. 
Microfinance policy should take into consideration the congruence between commercial objective 
and poverty outreach. This will ensure that impact assessment is not relegated to the backstage as a 
result of too much emphasis on institutional sustainability. Also, it is imperative to get this policy 
presumptuously right from the outset through consultations with all relevant stakeholders in the 
microfinance industry and pilot testing.  
 
5.0 Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation  
5.1 Summary of Findings  
The main objective of this study is to determine how effective microfinance policies are in the Nigerian context in 
reducing poverty of target clients. The Nearest Neighbour, Radius and Kernel Matching Techniques based on 
propensity scores were used to analyse the effect of client registration in AMJU programmes. The following are 
summary of findings.  
(i) As demonstrated by the increase in the exit rate, AMJU may consider innovations in delivery 
mechanism particularly the area of evolving individual lending for those clients that have attained 
some level of stability and relative independence in their businesses.  
(ii) Also, AMJU needs to review loan sizes since many members expressed dissatisfaction with small 
loan size. Failure to increase loan size may force some active members to drop out from the 
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programme. It is important to keep in mind that for any financial service to have a lasting impact on 
poverty reduction, it should be delivered in flexible way and innovative to adapt to the needs of its 
clients. This product will enhance high repayment rate, engender business continuity and customer 
loyalty.  
(iii) In all, there were indicators that clients who have accessed loans (treatment group) are somewhat 
better off than those that are yet to benefit. The study has also helped to clarify the misconception 
that propensity score matching (PSM) needed to be modified in the presence of choice-based 
sampling, over – or under-sampling of treatment group as in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 
(1998) and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997).  
 
5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations  
One of the areas of interest to these stakeholders is the determination of impact of microfinance. In other words, 
impact assessment of microfinance intervention became a major issue in the development paradigm. In recent 
years, researches on impact evaluation produced mixed results due to environmental peculiarities, evaluation 
method applied by the researchers and operational methodologies by the various microfinance institutions.  
Nonetheless, despite the conflicting findings, attempts are still being made to ascertain the efficacy of 
microfinance in delivering the desired promise of poverty reduction. Unfortunately, most of the previous impact 
assessment focused on Latin America and Asia with little attention to Africa especially Nigeria. Therefore, this 
study is part of the ongoing efforts in the application of the growing field of microeconometrics in impact 
evaluation programmes. The study used a successful microfinance institutions, AMJU as a study sample.  
The findings in the study reveal that microfinance delivery mechanism such as proper client targeting, 
appropriate product design, flexible regulatory stance is central to operational methodology. In particular, the study 
confirmed the assertion that repeat loan is an important feature of microfinance in achieving its poverty reduction 
objectives.  
The following recommendations were made at the end of our study and includes; 
i. Delivery methodology for microfinance should be tailored after their individual operational strategy 
and client target. 
ii. Feedback mechanism should be built into product delivery to enable impact evaluation of target 
participants’ responses. 
iii. Microfinance policies should take cognizance of commercial objective and poverty outreach. 
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APPENDIX 
SUSTAINABILITY AND SUCCESS INDICATORS OF AMJU 
Performance 
indicator  
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Outreach – Breadth  
No. of Branches 3 5 9 9 13 
No. of Clients  17,578 21,766 24,563 32,938 48,735 
No. of new clients 5,744 11,019 14,782 22,208 31,167 
No. of Women 16,699 20,678 24,072 32,279 46,298 
No. of active 
borrowers 
13,859 18,740 23,136 29,812 43,699 
Total loans 
disbursed (N) 
86,584,195.00 194,476,200.00 361,190,050.00 620,517,150.00 1,005,827,500.00 
Outreach – Depth  
Average loan 
(total loan/No. of 
active 
borrowers( (N) 
6,248 10,378 15,612 20,814 23,017 
Clients drop-out 
rate 
8.57% 14.18% 21.00% 22.21% 31.17% 
Screening 
Cost of loan 
administration 
(N)  
n/a 45,629,299.00 
 
779,888,073.00  111,071,728.00 149,029,707.00 
      
Enforcement/Risk  
Outstanding 
balance of loans 
exceeding 90 days 
(N) 
11,298,423.00 11,073,419.00 14,424,323.00 2,641,531.00 4,713,112.00 
 
Outstanding 
balance/total loan 
0.1305 0.0569 0.0399 0.0043 0.0047 
Total bad debt (N) n/a 5,666,794.00 725,551.00 --- 5,927.00 
PAR 30 days      
No. of credit 
officers 
54 69 90 114 149 
Institutional performance 
(staff productivity)  
Total clients/loan 
officer 
326 315 273 289 327 
Total cost of loan 
admin/loan 
officer 
n/a 661,294 8,665,423 974,313 1,000,199 
No. of staff 28 35 43 56 63 
Staff turnover rate 5.36 5.59 14.74 8.78 6.78 
Total income 
from loans (N) 
11,628,355.00 288,249,232.00 53,631,198.00 104,131,897.00 157,406,505.00 
Total income 
from donors (N) 
10,229,070.00 14,552,119.00 748,200.00 --- 60,973,392.00 
No. of credit 
officers 
54 69 90 114 149 
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Performance 
indicator  
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
No. of 
groups/unions 
547 585 1400 1885 2546 
No. of fraud cases    4 5 3 
Total value of 
fraud (N) 
  253,010.00 203,720.00 192,290.00 
Number of 
union/loan officer 
10 8 16 17 17 
Administrative  
Efficiency  
Admin Exp/Total 
loan 
- - - - 
Total loans/loan 
officer (N) 
1,603,411.02 2,818,495.65 4,013,222.78 5,443,132.89 6,750,520.13 
Interest Charge  
Interest rate of 
loans  
36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 
T-bill rate  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Interest premium 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 
Source: AMJU Admin Records at Head Office.  
